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BEYOND BOSNIA AND IN RE KASINGA: 
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN PROTECTING 
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
Linda A. Malone* 
I. !NTRODUCfiON 
In July of 1995, the Prime Minister of Japan announced he would send 
official letters expressing "humble apologies" to hundreds of women vic-
tims of Japanese brutality during World War II.1 Japan planned to collect 
private donations and utilize government money to provide compensa-
tion and treatment for any survivor.2 Of the approximately 800 to 1,000 
victims who are believed to still be alive, each would receive a personal 
letter from the Prime Minister along with cash and medical care.3 In 
August of 1996, the first letters were sent ·to these so-called "comfort 
women"4 in several Asian countries.5 
The announcement was a striking reminder that the international pub-
lic's outrage over sexual violence toward women is morally, but not his-
* Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, College of William and Mary 
School of Law. LL.M., University of Dlinois College of Law (1984); J.D., Duke Law 
School (1978); B.A., Vassar College (1975). The author gratefully acknowledges the 
comments of Joan Fitzpatrick on this Essay. 
1 T.R. Reid, Japan to Apologize to 'Comfort Women,' WASH. PosT, July 13, 1995, at 
A18. One journalist noted that "[t]he forced prostitution - which Japan has only 
acknowledged in the past five years - is one of the cruelest memories of Japan's 
harsh colonial rule over much of east Asia in the 1940s." Id. A United Nations 
investigator stated that Japan showed "'extraordinary inhumanity' in forcing 200,000 
women from conquered territory to work as 'comfort women' at facilities near its 
military bases." Japan Must Pay Ex-Sex Slaves, U.N. Aide Says, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 
1996, at A15 (citing the report produced by Radhika Coomaraswamy, United Nations 
Special Investigator into Violence against Women). 
2 Reid, supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 
"Comfort women" is the term used to describe the hundreds of thousands of 
women who were forced to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers fighting in Asian 
nations during the war. Id. 
5 Id. The U.N. Special Investigator into Violence against Women has also called 
for damages, apologies, and punishment of those responsible for the sex slavery. 
Japan Must Pay Ex-Sex Slaves, supra note 1. 
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torically justified. 6 Although rape by soldiers has been prohibited by the 
laws of war for hundreds of years and a violator subject to punishment 
under national military codes,7 in many cases rape has been given license, 
either as encouragement for soldiers or as an instrument of policy.8 It has 
only been within the last few decades that moral indignation has given 
rise to action. Recent events in Bosnia have brought the deficiencies of 
international law in addressing international responsibility for sexual vio-
lence toward women to the forefront. This Essay examines the interna-
tional response to the mass rapes in Bosnia, the case of In re Kasinga, and 
other developments within international law to provide context to a dis-
cussion as to whether any progress has been made in the world's response 
to sexual violence against women. 
II. INTERNATIONAL STUDY AND RESPONSE TO THE MASS RAPES IN 
BosNIA 
Rape was not mentioned in the Nuremberg Charter or prosecuted in 
Nuremberg as a war crime under customary internationallaw.9 In con-
trast, however, .rape was prosecuted in Tokyo as a war crime,10 most nota-
bly with reference to the notorious "Rape of Nanking" during which an 
international committee estimated that 20,000 women were raped during 
the first month of the Japanese occupation.11 The international military 
6 Although violence against women is the focus of this Essay, the horrors of war 
will resonate for years to come in the children of this conflict. According to recent 
UNICEF statistics on the suffering of the 65,000 children in Sarajevo, 76% believed 
they would die soon; 40% had been shot at by snipers; 51 o/o had seen someone killed; 
39% had seen on•~ or more family members killed; 19% had witnessed a massacre; 
48% had their homes occupied; 73% had their homes attacked or shelled; and 89% 
had lived in underground shelters. John Pomfret, Balkans Must Confront a History of 
Hatred, WASH. PoST, Dec. 17, 1995, at Al, A35. 
7 Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Rape as a Crime under International 
Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993); see also Rhonda Copelan, 
Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 
HASTINGS WoMEN'S L.J. 243, 248 (1994). 
8 Meron, supra note 7, at 425 (footnote omitted). 
9 /d. at 425-26; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA McCoRMICK, SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: AN INviSIBLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33 (Int'l 
Human Rights Law Inst. Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR). 
1° Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 
amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20; Meron, supra note 7, at 426; 
see also SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR, supra note 9, at 33. 
11 2 THE LAw OF WAR: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 1061 (Leon Friedman ed., 
1972) (hereinafter THE LAW OF WAR]. For an account of the war crimes trial by a 
United Press correspondent covering the tribunal, see ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE 
OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
(1987). 
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tribunal in Tokyo did conclude that some Japanese military and civilian 
officials were guilty of war crimes, including rape, because they had failed 
to carry out their duty to ensure that those under their command com-
plied with intemationallaw.12 General Iwane Matsui was held criminally 
responsible for the Rape of Nanking. Matsui served as Commander-in-
Chief of the Central China Area Army which captured the city of Nank-
ing. The tribunal said that it was satisfied that Matsui "knew what was 
happening ... [but] did nothing, or nothing effective, to abate these 
horrors."13 
Such practices may have at the very least been facilitated by the gaps in 
the law of war and the humanitarian rules of warfare concerning rape. 
For example, Article 46 of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land can be read to include rape, but in practice it has 
seldom been so interpreted. Article 46 provides, "[f]amily honour and 
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious con-
victions and practice, must be respected."14 Additionally, both the 
Fourth Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians15 and the addi-
tional protocols to that Convention16 explicitly and categorically prohibit 
rape, but these documents do not list rape among the grave breaches of 
the Convention subject to universal jurisdictionP 
The failure to recognize rape as a grave breach of international law 
began to surface in response to the public outrage over the reports of 
atrocities occurring in the former Yugoslavia.18 Individual victims, disin-
terested witnesses, human rights organizations, and official United 
Nations observers and reporters have documented the rape of women in 
Bosnia beyond dispute. 
12 CHIHIRO HosoYA ET AL., THE ToKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: AN 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 201 (1986). 
13 THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 11, at 1142; see also PHILIP R. PI CCI GALLO, THE 
JAPANESE ON TRIAL' ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945-1951 28 
(1979) (noting that the tribunal found Matsui guilty of a "disregard of duty" and a 
failure "to prevent breaches" of the laws of war). 
14 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 2306-07, 1 Bevans 631, 651. 
15 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tune of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
16 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
17 Copelan, supra note 7, at 249-50. 
18 Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (!992), U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Annex 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. Sf 
25274 (1993) (stating that reports from the former Yugoslavia have referred to 
"allegations of widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault"). 
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As early as 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross had 
declared that "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health" under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention covered 
rape.19 However, it is unclear whether the massive and systematic prac-
tice of rape and its use as a national instrument of "ethnic cleansing"20 
qualified it to be defined and prosecuted as a crime against humanity. A 
crime against humanity, as defined in the Nuremberg Charter, includes 
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed! against any civilian population, before or during war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. "21 
Soon after the Red Cross declared that rape was a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, the U.S. Department of State stated that rape was a 
war crime. The State Department also concluded that rape could be 
prosecuted in the manner of a grave breach of customary international 
law or of the Geneva Conventions.22 In prosecuting such a case, how-
ever, "(p]roof of systematic governmental planning [is] considered a nec-
essary element of crimes against humanity, in contrast to war crimes."23 
This evidentiary burden adds to the difficulties of proof that is entailed 
when a government systematically uses rape as a weapon of war. 
A. "Ethnic Cleansing" 
The Final Report of the Commission of Experts for the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia documented "widespread and systematic rape and 
other forms of sexual assault."24 The Commission particularly sought to 
examine the relationship between "ethnic cleansing," rape, and other 
forms of sexual assault. It noted that owing to the social stigma in this 
culture "rape is among the least reported crimes,"25 and this fact makes 
the actual number of rape victims difficult to assess.26 From the Fall of 
19 Comite Intemational de Ia Croix-Rouge, Aide-Memoire 1 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
20 
"Ethnic cleansing" was a strategy in which various methods, such as torture, 
sexual violence and mass killings, were employed to "permanently force non-Serb 
populations out of areas targeted to become part of 'Greater Serbia.'" SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR, supra note 9, at 5. 
21 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286. 
22 Meron, supra note 7, at 427 (citing a letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993)). 
23 /d. at 428. 
24 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 3, 55, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 
(1994) [hereinafter Final Report]. 
25 !d. at 56. 
26 /d. The Commission further noted that the reluctance to report rape was 
aggravated by the war, and that victims had "little confidence in finding justice." !d. 
1996] BEYOND BOSNIA AND IN RE KASINGA 323 
1991 to the end of 1993, estimates of the total number of rape victims 
were in the range of twenty thousand.27 
The majority of these rapes occurred from April to November 1992; 
fewer rapes occurred during the following five months.28 During these 
months, the number of media reports of sexual violence increased from a 
few in March 1992 to a high of 535 new stories in January 1993.29 The 
Commission noted that "[i]n Bosnia, some of the ... rape and sexual 
assault cases committed by the Serbs ... against Muslims [were] clearly 
the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of com-
mand direction or an overall policy."30 Nevertheless, the Commission's 
report concluded that the rise and fall in the numbers of rape alone indi-
cated "that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators if they 
wanted to," pointing to the "conclusion that there was an overriding pol-
icy advocating the use of rape as a method of 'ethnic cleansing,' rather 
than a policy of omission, tolerating the widespread commission of 
rape.1' 31 Part of an overall pattern discerned by the Commission 
included: 
similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; 
simultaneous commission of other international humanitarian law 
violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to 
displace civilian populations; common elements in the commission of 
rape, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim, but 
also the victim's community; and the timing of rapes.32 
One factor that the Commission found particularly convincing in demon-
strating an organized policy of sexual violence was "the large number of 
rapes which occurred in places of detention. "33 These rapes did not 
appear to be random, and they indicated at the very least a "policy of 
encouraging rape supported by the deliberate failure of camp com-
manders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the 
personnel under their authority."34 
27 SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INviSIBLE WEAPON OF WAR, supra note 9, at 10 (citing 
a figure reported by a European Commission investigatory team). 
28 Final Report, supra note 24, at 56. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. at 66. 
31 /d. at 56. 
32 /d. at 60. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. "Women [were] frequently selected at random during the night [and the] 
rapes [were] done in a way [to instill] terror in the women prisoner population." /d. 
at 55. "The Commission [had] information indicating ... girls as young as 7 years old 
and women as old as 65 had been raped while in captivity." /d. "Captors have killed 
women who resisted being raped, often in front of other prisoners." !d. The 
Commission goes on to document in detail the methods in which the rapes are 
perpetrated. /d. 
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From report:; of these atrocities, the Commission of Experts stated that 
the "[r]apes seem[ed] to occur in conjunction with efforts to displace the 
targeted ethnic group from the region."35 This purpose was furthered by 
the "heightened shame and humiliation [from] raping victims in front of 
adult and minor family members ... other detainees, or in public places, 
or by forcing family members to rape each other. "36 Furthermore, many 
of the witnesses reported "that perpetrators said they were ordered to 
rape, or that [their purpose] was to ensure that the victims and their fami-
lies would never want to return to the area," because they would return 
to more of the same.37 The perpetrators would "tell female victims that 
they [would] bear [Serbian] children ... that they must become pregnant, 
and [that they would be held] in custody until it was too late for [them] to 
[obtain] an abortion. "38 Victims were also threatened that if they ever 
told anyone what had happened, "the perpetrators [would] hunt them 
down and kill them."39 Although there were incidences of rape being 
reported by all sides, "the largest number of reported victims [were 
clearly] Bosnian Muslims, and the largest number of alleged perpetrators 
[were] Bosnian Serbs."40 Young women, virgins, prominent members of 
the community, and educated women were particularly targeted for rape, 
according to the report. 41 
In March 1993, Bosnia filed an application against Serbia and Monte-
negro in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based in part on allega-
tions of mass and systematic rape.42 In April 1993, and again in 
September, the ICJ ordered Serbia and Montenegro to take all measures 
immediately to prevent the commission of genocide.43 It is not clear if 
the decline in rapes was a reaction to the bad publicity and the case 
35 Id. at 59. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 59-60. 
39 Id. at 60. 
40 Id.; see also Copelon, supra note 7, at 244 n.7. 
41 Final Reporr, supra note 24, at 60. 
42 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.CJ. 3-4 (order of Apr. 8). 
43 I d. at 24. In September 1993, the IO reaffirmed the April1993 order directing 
Serbia to prevent the crime of genocide. Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 
I.C.J. 325, 349 (order of Sept. 13). On July 11, 1996, the Court rejected all of the 
preliminary objections raised by Serbia and Montenegro and found that it has 
jurisdiction to address the merits of the case under Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.CJ. at <http:// 
www.Iaw.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/judgment.htm> (July 1996). 
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before the Court, or recognition that the rapes had served their purpose 
of deterring families from ever returning to their homes.44 
Fmally, on May 3, 1993, the Secretary General of the United Nations 
issued a report concerning the implementation of an international tribu-
nal to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes in the former Yugo-
slavia.45 The Security Council approved the Secretary General's report 
on May 25, 1993, and adopted the statute annexed to that report.46 
B. Aftermath 
It is a tragedy that so many women have suffered so much in order to 
shock the public, international lawyers in particular, into expanding this 
neglected area of the law. For the first time the Security Council estab-
lished a tribunal to evaluate compliance with international humanitarian 
law.47 The Security Council established the tribunal under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter invoking its authority on humanitarian 
grounds.48 
Whatever may come of the International Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, its mere establishment has provided one major development in this 
area: the statute of the International Tribunal lists rape among the crimes 
against humimity.49 Yet, even in the statute of the Tribunal, rape is not 
explicitly mentioned in Article 2 concerning what constitutes a grave 
breach, Article 3 concerning general violations of the laws and customs of 
war, or Article 4, dealing with genocide.50 Although each of these arti-
cles can be read to implicitly authorize prosecution for rape and other 
gender specific violations, limiting express treatment of rape to crimes 
against humanity necessarily makes prosecution in other contexts more 
difficult. Furthermore, the association of rape with crimes against 
humanity minimizes the atrocity of rape on an individual basis when not 
44 See SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR, supra note 9, at 22. 
45 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution BOB (1993), U.N. SCOR at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
46 Res. 827, U.N. ESCOR, 3217th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
47 Meron, supra note 7, at 424. 
48 U.N. CHARTER ch. VII; see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization 
of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995) (noting that both the 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
promulgated under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). 
49 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution BOB (1993), Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 48th 
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25074, at 36, 38 (1993), revised by U.N. Doc. S/25704/Corr. 
1 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the International Tribunal]. 
50 Id. at 36-38. 
326 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:319 
demonstrated to be massive and systematic as required for crimes against 
humanity.51 
III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WHEN EVALUATED 
BEYOND THE BOSNIAN ATROCITIES 
There are other notable deficiencies in the law of human rights with 
respect to sexual violence. Custodial rape and any other rape perpe-
trated under the auspices of official authority should be recognized as 
torture. The Bosnia indictments refer to torture sparingly in all contexts, 
with the notable exception of sexual mutilation of a male prisoner.52 
Recognition of rape as torture would include it within the grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, facilitate suits in the United States federal 
courts under the Alien Tort Statute53 and the Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991,54 and underscore the gravity of individual as opposed to 
mass or genocidal rape. Although rape is included in the Tribunal Statute 
as a crime against humanity, it is always in reference to "ethnic cleans-
ing," thereby clouding the treatment of mass rape of women as a crime 
without reference to ethnicity.55 
Responsibility for gender-based violence resulting from political 
oppression in peacetime, where a state fails to protect women from vio-
lence, or condones or supports subjugation and persecution of women, is 
even less fully developed than responsibility for the use of violence 
against women during armed conflict. Recourse in our own federal 
courts is hampered by the slow recognition in human rights law of the 
responsibilities of non-state actors.56 
In recent years, however, there have been some encouraging legal 
developments in human rights law protecting women against sexual vio-
lence. Gender-based violence has been condemned by the Vienna Decla-
ration of 1993,57 the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing,58 
51 Copelon, supra note 7, at 259 (arguing that the narrow view of rape and 
persecution within the concept of crimes against humanity would jeopardize its 
application to women). 
52 !d. at 255. 
53 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (1994). 
54 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a). 
55 Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 49, at 38. For development of 
this issue, see Copelon, supra note 7, at 257. 
56 See Doe I vs. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the 
court did not have jurisdiction), rev'd sub nom. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 232 
(2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377, 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 
3837 (No. 95-1599) (June 18, 1996). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear a case brought by Israeli citizens against Libya), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985). 
57 Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, World Conference on Human 
Rights, at 20, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) (1993). 
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the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,59 and the General Assembly.60 
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Violence against Women has 
recognized gender-based violence as a violation of a woman's human 
rights.61 The European Commission on Human Rights, while finding a 
petition inadmissible, also stated in dicta that a state has a positive obliga-
tion to provide adequate protection for women against gender-based vio-
lence and harassment.62 The Tribunal's indictments for the former 
Yugoslavia charge rape as a war crime, a grave breach, genocide and a 
crime against humanity. The most significant progression with regard to 
gender violence is the indictment of eight Serbs for crimes against 
humanity and grave breaches of international law for the gang rape, tor-
ture, and sexual enslavement of Muslim women in Foca.63 The Statute of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda represents another step forward 
by including rape, forced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault in 
Article 4 of the Statute.64 Article 4 of the Statute is based on Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions65 and common Article 3.66 In October of 
1995, the Second Circuit reinstated a suit under the Alien Tort Statute 
against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, holding that the law of 
58 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Fourth World Conference on 
Women, Annex I, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995). 
59 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights: Report on the Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 23, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1993/122 (1993). 
60 Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100 (c), at 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/ 
205 (1995) ("Appalled at the continuing and unsubstantiated reports of widespread 
rape and abuse .... "); Violence Against Women Migrant Workers, U.N. GAOR, 49th 
Sess., Agenda Item 97, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/165 (1995) ("Noting with concern 
the continuing reports of grave abuses and acts of violence committed against . . . 
women migrant workers by some of their employers .... "); Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, at 
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994) (affirming that "violence against women 
constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women"); Rape and 
Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. 
GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 114(c), at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/143 (1994) 
("Appalled at the recurring and substantiated reports of widespread rape and abuse 
of women and children in the areas of armed conflict .... "). 
61 Report of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11th 
Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 2, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992). 
62 Whiteside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20357/92, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 80, 86 (1994). 
63 But see Clare Dyer, Law: Bringing Barbarians to the Bar, GuARDIAN, Sept. 24, 
1996, at 17 (discussing the various difficulties in bringing the indicted men to trial in 
the Hague). 
64 Res. 955, U.N. ESCOR, 3453rd mtg., Annex, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. at 4. 
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nations applies to acts of private individuals that are cognizable violations 
of customary international law, including rape, forced prostitution and 
impregnation, although only if they were committed in pursuit of geno-
cide or war crimes.67 Outside the context of an ongoing military conflict, 
the Security Council seems closer than ever to establishing an interna-
tional criminal court to deal with genocide and crimes against humanity.68 
In addition, the 1995 report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights on Haiti concluded: 
[The sexual violence against women during 1993 was generally for 
political purposes and constituted torture] in order to punish women 
for their militancy and/or their association with militant family mem-
bers and to intimidate or destroy their capacity to resist the regime 
and sustain the civil society particularly in the poor communities. 
Rape and the threat of rape against women also qualifies as torture 
in that it represents a brutal expression of discrimination against 
them as women. . . . [I]t is clear that in the experience of torture 
victims, rape and sexual abuse are forms of torture which produce 
some of the most severe and long-lasting traumatic effects.69 
The Report also found that rape as a weapon of terror against women is a 
crime against humanity in peacetime. 70 
Women's rights advocates have welcomed in the immigration areas rec-
ognition of feminism as political opinion,71 the 1995 gender guidelines 
67 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,242-43 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 14 F.3d 377 
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3837 (No. 95-1599) (June 18, 1996). 
68 John M. Goshko, U.N. Moving Toward Creation of Criminal Court, WAsH. PosT, 
Apr. 21, 1996, at A27. 
69 TRANSLATED EXCERPTS FROM: INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN HAITI. reprinted in Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No 
Longer?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 771, 787, 791 (1995). 
70 !d. at 791. 1he Board of Immigration Appeals has also recognized that Haitian 
women, raped for political retribution, may qualify for asylum. D-V-, I. & N. Dec. 
3252 (B.I.A. May 25, 1993) (interim decision). 
71 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir.1993); but see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 
(9th Cir. 1996). In Fisher, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en bane held that an 
Iranian woman was not entitled to asylum, having failed to establish persecution due 
to her religious or political beliefs. /d. at 961-62. In dicta, the majority said she was 
not entitled to asylum because all she had demonstrated was discrimination on 
account of her sex: 
[A] law permitting the detention, arrest, or even imprisonment of a woman who 
does not wear the chador in Iran does not constitute persecution any more than it 
would if the same law existed in the United States. Persecution requires the 
government actor to inflict suffering on account of an individual's religious or 
political beliefs, race, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. 
/d. at 962 (emphasis in original). Two judges felt it necessary to concur separately to 
clarify that Fisher had not made any gender-based claims in the social group category. 
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recognizing violence against women as potential grounds for asylum,72 
the 1996 interim guidelines allowing battered spouses and children to 
"self-petition" for immigrant status,73 and most recently, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) decision in In re Kasinga advocating 
recognition of female genital mutilation as grounds for political asylum.74 
IV. IN RE KASINGA 
Fauziya Kasinga, a nineteen year-old native of Togo, was a member of 
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo.75 Young women of that 
tribe normally undergo female genital mutilation at age fifteen.76 Kasinga 
was not subjected to the procedure because of the protection of her influ-
Id. at 965-66 (Canby and Thompson, JJ., concurring). In a strongly worded dissent 
relying heavily on the 1995 gender guidelines, Judges Noonan and Fletcher criticized 
the controversial and unnecessary dicta of the majority opinion: 
As Judge Canby's concurrence observes, the case as governed by the guidelines 
has not been presented to us and so cannot now be decided by us. The majority 
of the en bane panel reaching out to decide what it has no power to decide speaks 
of course for those making up this majority. Its dicta do not constitute Ninth 
Circuit law. It is this particular majority which has the view that if in the United 
States a law imposed a religiously-inspired dress code on all women under pen-
alty of imprisonment the law would not be evidence of persecution of a particular 
social group. If only there is a law, if only the law is general enough, half of the 
population may be subjected to discrimination and subject to incarceration for 
disobedience to the discriminatory regulation. We are not very far from The 
Handmaid's Tale when seven judges of this court are capable of expressing such a 
view. 
Id. at 969 (Noonan and Fletcher, JJ., dissenting). 
72 MEMORANDUM: CoNSIDERATION FoR AsYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING 
AsYLUM CLAIMS FROM WoMEN, reprinted in Anker, supra note 69, at 794. For 
reports on the INS guidelines, see Judith Gaines, INS Eases Asylum Guidelines for 
Women, BosTON GLOBE, May 27, 1995, at 13; Michael J. Sniffen, Immigration Rules 
Focus on Sexual Violence, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 27, 1995, at A12; Lena H. 
Sun, INS Expands Asylum Protection for Women, WASH. PosT, June 3, 1995, at A4. 
73 Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a 
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and 
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 204, 205 & 
216) (interim rule effective Mar. 26, 1996). 
74 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3278 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996) (interim decision); see also 
Pamela Constable, INS Says Mutilation Claim May Be Basis for Asylum, WAsH. PosT, 
Apr. 24, 1996, at A3. 
75 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3278 at 3. 
76 Id. In evaluating Kasinga's application and circumstances, the Court noted: 
According to the applicant's testimony, the female genital mutilation (FGM) 
practiced by her tribe, the Tchamba-Kunsuntu, is of an extreme type involving 
cutting the genitalia with knives, extensive bleeding, and a 40-day recovery 
period . . . . The background materials confirm that the FGM practiced in some 
African countries, such as Togo, is of an extreme nature causing permanent 
damage, and not just a minor form of genital ritual. 
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ential father.77 On his death, however, her father's sister became the 
family authority figure under tribal custom and her mother was driven 
from the home.78 The aunt forced Kasinga into a polygamous marriage 
to a forty-five year-old man, and both of them planned to force her to 
submit to the procedure before consummation of the marriage.79 After 
fleeing to Ghana and Germany, Kasinga sought asylum in the United 
States where she had other relatives.80 Her aunt had reported her to the 
Togolese police who were looking for her.81 
In re Kasinga came before the Board of Immigration Appeals for hear-
ing en bane in a very unusual posture. In its first hearing en bane, the 
twelve judges were confronted with the general counsel of the INS argu-
ing for a broader formulation of asylum based on female genital mutila-
tion82 than did the counsel for the applicant. 83 Karen Musalo, of the 
International Human Rights Clinic at American University law school, 
chose to argue the applicant's position within traditional principles of asy-
lum jurisprudence, narrowly and circumspectly tailoring the grounds for 
asylum to the specific facts of the case. In contrast, the INS general coun-
sel proposed a "framework of analysis"84 for all asylum petitions pre-
mised on the practice of female genital mutilation. Given the INS' 
The record material establishes that FGM in its extreme forms is a practice in 
which portions of the female genitalia are cut away. In some cases, the vagina is 
sutured partially closed. This practice clearly inflicts harm or suffering upon the 
girl or woman who undergoes it. 
FGM is extremely painful and at least temporarily incapacitating. It 
permanently disfigures the female genitalia. FGM exposes the girl or woman to 
the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications. These include, 
among others, bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological 
trauma, and damage to the urethra and anus. It can result in permanent loss of 
genital sensation and can adversely affect sexual and erotic functions. 
/d. at 7 (citations omitted). 
77 /d. at 3. 
78 /d. 
79 /d. 
80 Id. at 5. 
81 /d. at 4. Kasinga's story was subsequently corroborated by her family in Togo. 
See Cindy Shiner, Persecution by Circumcision, Woman Who Fled Togo Convinced 
U.S. Court but not Town Elders, WASH PosT, July 3, 1996, at Al. Her mother who 
had given her almost all of her own $3,500 inheritance, eventually had to ask the 
family patriarch to forgive her and allow her to live in his home. Celia W. Dugger, A 
Refugee's Body is Intact but Her Family is Torn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. 
82 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 20. This practice has also been termed 
"female circumcision," "traditional female genit~J surgery" (FGS), and "Irua." The 
nomenclature alone is a controversial subject. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and 
"Female Genital Mutilation:" Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural 
Divide, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 4-8 (1995). In Kasinga the court uses the term FGM. 
Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 2. 
83 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 2. 
84 Id. at 18. 
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acknowledgment that female genital mutilation could be grounds for asy-
lum, the only issue to be addressed, according to the majority, was 
whether this particular applicant was entitled to asylum on the basis of 
the record.85 The result is a perfunctory, narrowly confined majority 
decision of eight Board members which seems deliberately minimalist to 
de-emphasize its significance.86 Three Board members wrote two concur-
ring opinions,87 and one member dissented without opinion.88 
Kasinga's case was extensively documented on the practice and effects 
of female genital mutilation, its international condemnation, and the poor 
human rights record of Togo with respect to women.89 In describing 
female genital mutilation and finding that the described level of harm 
constituted "persecution,"90 the majority relied heavily on the FGM Alert 
prepared by the INS Resource Information Center91 and a May 26, 1995 
memorandum from Phyllis Coven in the Office of International Affairs of 
85 !d. at 11. 
86 The majority opinion is authored by Chairman Paul W. Schmidt and joined by 
Dunne, Holmes, Hurwitz, Villageliu, Cole, Mathon and Guendelsberger. /d. at 2. 
87 The concurring opinions are by Lauri Steven Filppu Goined by Michael J. 
Heilman) and Lory D. Rosenberg. /d. 
88 Board member Fred W. Vacca dissents without opinion. /d. 
89 !d. at 5-7. Evidence included letters from the applicant's mother in Togo 
confirming Kasinga's impending marriage and that the Togolese police were looking 
for her daughter, translated copies of Kasinga's marriage certificate, an untranslated 
letter from the Togolese police, a letter from a cultural anthropologist substantiating 
Kasinga's claims, and a lengthy pre-hearing brief documenting the practice of FGM in 
Togo and the country's poor human rights record. Unfortunately, few such claims are 
as well presented, often at the expense of deserving applicants. 
90 /d. at 12. 
91 /d. at 7. The FGM Alert notes: 
[F]ew African countries have officially condemned female genital mutilation and 
still fewer have enacted legislation against the practice . . . Further ... even in 
those few African countries where legislative efforts have been made, they are 
usually ineffective to protect women against FGM. The FGM Alert notes that 
"that it remains practically true that [African] women have little legal recourse 
and may face threats to their freedom, threats or acts of physical violence, or 
social ostracization for refusing to undergo this harmful traditional practice or 
attempting to protect their female children." ... Togo is not listed ... as among 
the African countries that have made even minimal efforts to protect women 
fromFGM. 
/d. at 8 (citations omitted). 
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the INS on the 1995 gender guidelines.92 The opinion also noted two 
State Department reports on human rights abuses in Togo.93 
With little legal analysis, the opinion addresses: (1) female genital muti-
lation as persecution;94 (2) definition of the "social group;"95 and (3) the 
applicant's fear of persecution "on account of' membership in that 
group. 96 The majority reaffirmed its prior decisions that "persecution can 
consist of the infliction of harm or suffering by a government, or persons 
a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a character-
istic of the victim."97 Intent to punish is not a necessary element of perse-
cution.98 The opinion then tersely states that "[o]ur characterization of 
FGM as persecution is consistent with our past definitions of that 
term,"99 dispensing with the controversial Matter ofChang100 case by sim-
ply noting agreement with the parties that the Kasinga case is not con-
trolled by Chang.101 
Whether or not female genital mutilation (FGM) constitutes "persecu-
tion" is a question that has sparked fierce debate among academics and 
activists. Universalists argue that fundamental human rights norms tran-
scend culture; cultural relativists argue that defining FGM as "persecu-
tion" challenges the cultural autonomy of the nations in Africa and the 
Arabian peninsula that practice FGM.102 Kasinga is one of several cases 
in recent years brought before immigration judges by women seeking asy-
lum in the United States in order to protect themselves or their children 
from FGM. These cases are the latest development in the discussion of 
whether, and if so, when, acts uniquely affecting women-such as rape,103 
92 /d. at 8. The INS memo is addressed to all INS Asylum Officers and sets forth 
guidelines to adjudicate women's asylum claims. Id. The INS Guidelines state that 
"rape . . . sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation are 
forms of mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they may serve as 
evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the five grounds." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
93 /d. at 8-9. 
94 /d. at 12. 
95 /d. at 13-14. 
96 Id. at 14-15. 
97 /d. at 12. 
98 /d. 
99 /d. at 13. 
100 Matter of C"'hang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43-44 (B.I.A. 1989) (finding that the "one 
couple, one child" policy of the People's Republic of China is not persecution even if 
involuntary sterilizations occur). 
1o1 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 13. 
102 See, e.g., L~wis. supra note 82, at 17-19; see also Doriane Lambelet Coleman, 
Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1093 (1996) (discussing the use of cultural evidence and the "cultural 
defense" in criminal trials). 
103 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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domestic violence,104 hejab,105 and FGM-can meet the persecution ele-
ments required for asylum. Feminist critics of current asylum law note 
that while "political opinion" protects male-dominated activities (for 
example guerilla activity, political agitation and union activity) and thus 
persecution of men, no such comparable category exists to protect against 
the kinds of oppression women generally experience.106 
The most complex issue, definition of the social group, is addressed in 
four brief paragraphs. The majority opinion very narrowly defines social 
group, based on the facts of the Kasinga case, as "[y]oung women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that 
tribe, and who oppose the practice."107 Citing its 1985 decision in Matter 
of Acosta,l08 the majority determined that a social group is defined by 
"common characteristics that members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because such characteristics 
are fundamental to their individual identities."109 The immutable charac-
teristics in Kasinga's case are that of being a "young woman" and a 
"member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe.''110 Moreover, the character-
istic of having "intact genitalia" is "so fundamental to the individual iden-
tity of a young woman that she should not be required to change it.'.n1 
The lack of analysis on the critical definition of social group is the least 
satisfactory aspect of the majority opinion.112 What degree of affiliation 
or homogeneity is necessary to a social group? Can the social group be 
defined primarily by the harm which constitutes the persecution, or is a 
separate element of linkage necessary? In this respect, the concurring 
opinion of Lory D. Rosenberg is the most thoughtful and helpful to 
future advocacy of women's claims.113 
104 Matter of Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461 (B.I.A. 1975). 
105 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); but see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
106 For example, in a 1987 case, the applicant had been raped by a military officer 
who threatened to expose her as a "subversive" if she resisted. To grant her asylum, 
the Ninth Circuit characterized the Salvadoran woman as a person persecuted on the 
basis of "political opinion" by imputing to her a "political opinion" against the 
Salvadoran government in power at the time. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435. 
107 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 13 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996). 
108 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other grounds, 
Matter of Moghrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
109 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 13. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 13-14. 
112 Rosenberg's concurring opm10n addresses the superficial nature of the 
majority's analysis. Id. at 25 (Rosenberg, L., concurring). 
113 As if to underscore the potential for broader utilization of the majority opinion, 
Rosenberg states: 
What we have done here, while we do not explicitly say so, is to posit, by 
example, the proper framework in which the individual facts of such claims made 
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She begins by emphasizing that "[t]here is nothing about a social group 
definition based upon gender that requires us to treat it as either an aber-
ration, or as an unanticipated development requiring a new standard."114 
Citing a number of authorities for the proposition that the social group 
category is to be broadly construed as a "catch-all" category beyond 
political opinion, race, religion, or ethnicity,115 Rosenberg emphasizes 
that social group claims, unlike political opinion claims, are status based 
and do not necessarily require a showing that the specific individual's 
opinions or activities were the cause of the persecution.116 In the context 
of female genital mutilation, therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate 
that the applicant voiced opposition to the practice. Acknowledging that 
the 1995 gender guidelines refer INS employees to international human 
rights instruments in assessing claims for asylum,117 Rosenberg argues 
that the Board should analyze gender-related asylum claims using the 
social group category formulated under Canadian jurisprudence, 118 the 
guidance of th€~ U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,119 and the United 
States and Canadian gender guidelines.120 
before the Setvice and before Immigration Judges should be considered and 
judged. In swn, we have, in the majority opinion, set forth a road map for 
analysis appropriate for this case, which may easily be extrapolated and applied 
in upcoming adjudications, not only of gender-based asylum claims, but in many 
other asylum applications. 
!d. at 31. 
114 !d. at 27. 
115 /d. at 28 (citing Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing 
Persecution Based on Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 
137, 145 (1995) (in turn citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution" 
in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 11 (1991))). 
116 Id. 
117 /d. at 30-31. The gender guidelines are not technically binding on the BIA, and 
therefore their utilization in the opinion is itself significant. Moreover, this 
concurring judge questions the failure of the INS to refer to the gender guidelines in 
this case. Id. at 31. 
118 See Cheung v. Canada, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 214, 218-20 (1993). The Cheung Court 
held that individuals comprise a social group when they share a "similar social status 
and hold a similar interest which is not held by their government. They have basic 
characteristics in c:ommon. All of the people ... are united or identified by a purpose 
which is so fundamental to their human dignity .... " !d. at 220. See also Mayers v. 
Canada, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 729 (1993). 
119 Kasinga I. & N. Dec. 3257 at 30. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH CoMMISSIONER 
FOR REFUGEES, MEMORANDUM: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (UNHCR Div. lnt'l 
Protection, 1994); UNHCR, Sexual Violence against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevent 
[sic] and Responsee [sic] (Extracts) (1995), reprinted in 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 720 
(1995). 
120 IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD., GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION Acr: WOMAN REFUGEE 
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993), reprinted in 5 INT'L J. 
REFUGEE L. 278 (1993). 
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The applicant's testimony and extensive documentation sufficiently 
showed her fear of persecution to be well founded, leaving only the ques-
tion of whether her fear of persecution was "on account of' her member-
ship in the previously defined social group.121 Relying upon exhibits 
demonstrating widespread international condemnation of female genital 
mutilation, the majority agreed with both parties that the practice is 
designed "at least in some significant part, to overcome sexual character-
istics of young women of the tribe who have not been, and do not wish to 
be, subjected to FGM."122 No further elaboration is offered on the nexus 
required between the social group and the persecution. 
The concurring opinion of Board members Filppu and Heilman is a 
response to the comprehensive arguments offered by the INS. The effect 
of both concurring opinions, however, is to illuminate the broader impli-
cations of this purportedly narrow, fact-specific decision. 
The Fuppu and Heilman concurrence emphasizes that both parties 
agreed that female genital mutilation could amount to persecution, that 
there was an identifiable social group, and that the persecution was "on 
account of' the applicant's inclusion in that group.123 These Board mem-
bers suggest that the comprehensive framework offered by the Service 
would be more appropriately addressed through the legislative or regula-
tory process.124 
121 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 14. The INS sought a remand based in part 
on credibility determinations. The majority had little difficulty dispensing with these 
issues because they were based on purported inconsistencies in the applicant's 
statements which did not affect the issues to be resolved. Id. at 10-11. The opinion 
also emphasized that a remand was not necessary given the length of time her 
application had been pending. Id. at 11. The applicant spent eight months in INS 
detention in several facilities, including one closed by a riot. Id. The INS argued for 
remand on the question of whether the applicant could avoid female genital 
mutilation by moving to another part of Togo. ld. at 15. The majority refused to 
remand noting that (1) FGM is widely practiced in Togo; (2) acts of violence and 
abuse against women in Togo are tolerated by the police; (3) the Government of Togo 
has a poor human rights record; ( 4) most African women can expect little government 
protection from FGM; and (5) Togo is a small country of approximately 22,000 square 
miles, slightly smaller than West Virginia. Id. at 15. The majority also took into 
consideration that the applicant would not be protected by the Togo police, because 
her husband was a well known individual who was a friend of the police. I d. This line 
of argument and analysis is itself quite troubling in the context of gender-based 
violence. The conditions necessary to establish prosecution a fortiori demonstrate at 
the least a failure on the part of the relevant government to provide effective 
protection. The majority's opinion suggests that the availability of asylum might tum 
on the status (or lack thereof) of the woman's spouse, the size of the country, or 
generally unrealistic expectations that women within tightly woven tribal cultures and 
oppressive societies may simply move from one area of the country to another. 
122 Id. at 15. 
123 Id. at 18. 
124 Id. 
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The INS offered a proposal for evaluating all such cases, suggesting 
that persecution encompasses any practice which "shocks the con-
science."125 Intent to punish the victim would not be necessary. The Ser-
vice's formulation seeks to exclude previously circumcised women 
because "a woman once circumcised cannot ordinarily be subjected to 
FGM a second time."126 Most distressing, however, is the Service's sug-
gestion that asylum be unavailable to past victims if they "consented" or 
"at least acquiesced" to it, offering the example of a woman who was 
subjected to female genital mutilation as "a small child," because the 
practice would not shock the conscience unless inflicted on an unconsent-
ing or resisting individual.127 This presumption of acquiescence for chil-
dren directly conflicts with the recognized rights of children in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child128 and directly contradicts the 
position of the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees on the inclusion of 
children as refugees who may be subject to female genital mutilation.129 
Surely with any such permanent and debilitating invasion of bodily integ-
rity, there should be a presumption of nonacquiescence until the individ-
ual has reached a level of maturity to make such a significant personal 
decision. 
Kasinga is a welcome, but qualified. success for women's rights advo-
cates. There is no question that the door has been opened by the INS's 
position and the Board's decision to recognize female genital mutilation 
as grounds for asylum. Yet that door to asylum may remain closed to 
many applicants without the representation, documentation, and extraor-
dinarily compelling facts available to this particular applicant. The inabil-
ity or unwillingness of the majority to elaborate on its findings of 
"persecution," "social group" and the "on account of' nexus may be 
nothing more than an exercise in judicial economy given the general con-
sensus of the opposing parties. The eagerness of the majority to find 
agreement between the parties, however, even when in fact they dis-
agreed on some elements (as in the precise definition of the social group 
with respect to personal opposition), suggests that critical points of analy-
sis may yet be undecided or contentious among the Board members. 
Beyond the surface acceptance of female genital mutilation as grounds 
for asylum, the position of the INS on many of these critical points would 
exclude many more applicants than it would accept. First, only female 
genital mutilation "in its more severe forms" (such as would "shock the 
conscience") would qualify.130 Past victims would almost always be 
125 !d. at 19. 
126 !d. at 21 (citation omitted). 
127 !d. 
128 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda 
Item 108, U.N. Doc AJRES/44/25 (1989). 
129 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 119. 
130 Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. No. 3257 at 15. 
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excluded,131 and there is, at the very least, the suggestion that small chil-
dren who would be subject to the procedure might be excluded as well.132 
A claimant would have to demonstrate that on return she would be 
seized and forcibly subjected to female genital mutilation; any pressure 
short of physical force would be insufficient.133 The possibility of reloca-
tion to another part of the country may defeat the claim.134 Also, accord-
ing to the INS brief, a demonstration that the practice may play a deeper 
political role or help perpetrate a system of male domination is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the "on account of' nexus.135 With its emphasis in Kas-
inga on the extreme form of genital mutilation, the police searching for 
the applicant, and the unavailability of relocation, as well as its definition 
of the social group with reference to opposing the practice, the majority 
opinion (deliberately or otherwise) provides implicit support for a 
number of the INS's limiting formulations. 
The majority opinion, unfortunately, is not an easy "road map" for 
upcoming adjudications, as Rosenberg's concurring opinion suggests136 
(indeed her own opinion is much more helpful to future claimants).137 In 
short, it is difficult to posit a more striking example of how omissions of 
gender related offenses on a par with other categories of prohibited con-
duct in an international human rights document (here, of course, the Ref-
ugee Conventions) complicate and impede the protection of women's 
rights.138 
V. A "WoMAN's PLACE" IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 
Given the long history of rape as a weapon in warfare and tool for 
oppression, it may seem surprising that the relevant human rights docu-
ments have not addressed gender violence more explicitly. This omission 
is much less surprising, however, when one considers the virtual exclusion 
of women from international lawmaking bodies. As of 1994, only eight of 
184 member states had women as their head, or acting head, of mission to 
the United Nations, and only two of the forty-eight sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly held since the founding of the United Nations have been 
131 Id. at 21, 23. 
132 /d. at 21. 
133 Id. 
134 /d. 
135 Id. 
136 /d. at 31. 
137 The importance of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision should not be 
underestimated. Federal district and circuit courts of appeal have been very 
deferential to its decisions. /d. at 30 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) and 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)). 
138 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force Apr. 22, 1954, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into 
force Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
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presided over by a woman president.139 Only the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly dealing with social, cultural and humanitarian affairs 
regularly has a significant number of women delegates.140 Until 1995, 
with the appointment of Rosalyn Higgins, there had never been a woman 
judge on the International Court of Justice, and Radhika Coomaras-
wamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, became 
the first woman ever appointed as Special Rapporteur by the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights.141 No woman has ever sat on the Interna-
tional Law Commission, the principal body of the United Nations 
charged with development and codification of international law.142 Few 
women have been elected to the specialized U.N. human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies, with the sole exception of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women.143 In fact, this Committee 
is the only treaty monitoring body which has been criticized by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council for its gender imbalance because of its failure 
to have enough men.144 As of July 1996, no woman ever has held, or ever 
been nominated for, the post of Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.145 In addition, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, based in Geneva, 
concluded in a report entitled Women in Parliaments 1945-1995: A World 
Statistical Survey that the number of women elected to national legisla-
tures has suffered a worldwide decrease of almost twenty-five percent in 
the last seven years.146 This decline is linked to the demise of socialism, 
which had preserved quotas for female participation in government. 
Especially in Eastern Europe and Africa, with democratic trends, free 
elections, and the end of quotas, female representation has failed to 
survive.147 
139 Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist Futures 
for the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 421, 423-24. (1994) 
[hereinafter Feminist Futures]. 
140 Id. at 424. 
141 World: Female Judge Elected, WASH. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at A8. It should be 
noted, however, that Richard Goldstone's recently named successor as Tribunal 
prosecutor is Louise Arbour from Canada. 
142 Feminist Futures, supra note 139, at 425. 
143 /d. at 425-26. 
144 Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 613, 624 (1991). 
145 Feminist Futures, supra note 139, at 428. See also John M. Goshko, Boutros-
Ghali to Seek Another Term at U.N., WASH. PosT, June 20, 1996, at A1, A28. 
("Considerable sp•eculation has centered on the idea that it might be time for a female 
secretary-general, and there has been much talk about the possible candidacies of 
Ireland's President Mary Robinson, Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland and Japan's Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees."). 
146 See Barbara Crossette, Women Losing Political Power, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 
27, 1995, at B8. 
147 /d. 
1996] BEYOND BOSNIA AND IN RE KASINGA 339 
In a recent interview, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Made-
leine K. Albright (one of just seven women among the U.N. representa-
tives and the only woman on the Security Council) was asked if rape 
would have been labeled a war crime earlier if there had been more 
women in foreign policy. She responded: 
Absolutely. No question. Male diplomats have a hard time with this 
issue. At the U.N., when I would bring up the evidence about rape 
as a war policy in Bosnia, they just didn't want to talk about it. 
They are even uncomfortable with rape as a metaphor. I'll tell you 
how I get people's attention in the Security Council. . . . Some peo-
ple are critical of the Bosnians for fighting back against the Serbs. 
And I say, "You are getting mad at the rape victim for defending 
herself." They get very embarrassed.148 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
To protect women from violence in all spheres, nothing less will suffice 
than constant vigilance to the gender-specific consequences of purport-
edly gender-neutral law. For example, on May 7, Cuban immigrant 
Mariella Batista went to a custody hearing with her nine year-old son. 
The estranged father of her son had a long history of beating her. The 
week before, Mariella Batista, seeking legal protection, had been refused 
assistance by Legal Services. As she approached the courthouse, she was 
shot and killed, in front of her son and the Legal Services attorney who 
had denied her legal assistance, by her son's father who in turn was shot 
and killed by the police a few moments later. Twelve days before 
Mariella Batista was killed, a law had been passed prohibiting Legal Serv-
ices from assisting anyone who is not a lawful permanent resident.149 In 
less than a month, Mariella Batista was scheduled for an interview with 
immigration authorities which routinely results in permanent resident sta-
tus for Cuban refugees.15° Congress is presently reconsidering the assist-
ance law.151 Ironically, Congress, in the same legislation that cut off 
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funding for Mariella Batista, found "the practice of female genital mutila-
tion is carried out by members of certain religious and cultural groups 
within the United States."152 In response, Congress directed "[f]ederal 
authorities to inform new immigrants from countries where it is com-
monly practiced that parents who arrange for their children to be cut 
here, as well a8 people who perform the cutting, face up to five years in 
prison." 153 
152 Department of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. 
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